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Michael Friedman & Colin Jakob Rittberg 1 
 
This paper inquires the ways in which paper folding constitutes a mathematical practice and 
may prompt a mathematical culture. To do this, we first present and investigate the common 
mathematical activities shared by this culture, i.e. we present mathematical paper folding as a 
material reasoning practice. We show that the patterns of mathematical activity observed in 
mathematical paper folding are, at least since the end of the 19th century, sufficiently stable to 
be considered as a practice. Moreover, we will argue that this practice is material. The 
permitted inferential actions when reasoning by folding are controlled by the physical realities 
of paper-like material, whilst claims to generality of some reasoning operations are supported 
by arguments from other mathematical idioms. The controlling structure provided by this 
material side of the practice is tight enough to allow for non-textual shared standards of 
argument and wide enough to provide sufficiently many problems for a practice to form. The 
upshot is that mathematical paper folding is a non-propositional and non-diagrammatic 
reasoning practice that adds to our understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the epistemic 
force of mathematical proof. We then draw on what we have learned from our contemplations 
about paper folding to highlight some lessons about what a study of mathematical cultures 
entails. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Many arguments found in mathematical proofs are wholly propositional. Others are partly 
diagrammatic. Recently, the philosophy of mathematical practice has studied diagrammatic 
reasoning in depth,2 showing that text and diagrams must be thought together to understand 
diagrammatic reasoning, without reducing one to the other. In this article we present and 
investigate a third type of mathematical reasoning: material reasoning. We present paper 
folding as an example, and, in a sense, exemplar of this reasoning. Our aim is to inquire what 
makes paper folding a mathematical practice, how it is structured, how reasoning in this 
practice is carried out, and eventually how this activity enables a mathematical culture. 
The practice of mathematical paper folding we focus on in this paper is the fold in 
which paper is folded flat onto itself and then opened up again. This creates a straight crease 
in the paper. Folding is thus an operation, which constructs a straight line on what we call the 
crease-diagram: the unfolded piece of paper on which a network of straight line creases lies. 
One can also construct the perpendicular to a line (i.e. to a crease) by folding the paper such 
that the crease is folded onto itself. We can also fold two given intersecting lines, one on top 
of the other, constructing the angle-bisector (to the angle between these lines) as the crease. In 
this manner we construct lines in a controlled fashion and this allows for doing geometry with 
it.3  It turns out that geometry by folding constructions is surprisingly strong. By folding we 
can trisect an angle and double the cube, two problems famously unsolvable via straightedge 
                                                          
1 Both authors have contributed equally to this work. 
2 Examples include (Mancosu 2008); (Manders 2008); (Avigad et al. 2009); (Leitgeb 2009); (Larvor 2012); (De 
Toffoli and Giardino 2014); (Larvor 2016).  
3  The use of a compass is prohibited in folding constructions and hence circles cannot be drawn. 
 and compass constructions alone.4 The reasoning involved in doubling the cube by paper 
folding will be presented in more detail later in this article (section 2). Folding points on lines 
or lines on lines are examples of basic folding operations.  What should be considered as basic 
folding operation is, however, not obvious, and mathematicians have explored this in detail 
and (eventually) proved the generality of these folds (sections 4 and 5). This stands in contrast 
to the situation with axiomatic reasoning practices, where the permissible inferential actions 
are fixed at the outset – e.g. in Euclidean practice by the first three postulates.5   
 
There are other types of paper folding, which might point to other styles of reasoning. 
Origami comes to mind, in which three-dimensional objects are created;6 another type of 
paper folding is the folding in which cuts are made to create two-dimensional objects.7 
Furthermore, one can generalize mathematical paper folding by allowing more than one fold 
to be made simultaneously. This defies the physical limitations of paper; it is impossible to 
fold two creases that meet on a sheet of paper simultaneously; see (Alperin and Lang 2009). 
In this article, we do not investigate the reasoning involved in the mathematics of these other 
types of paper folding. Our focus is exclusively on the reasoning of mathematical paper 
folding which folds and then opens the paper up again in the way described above and we will 
refer to it from now on as folding. 
 
One reason to investigate reasoning by folding is that it appears as a practice that is 
essentially different from diagrammatic reasoning. We aim to highlight some of these 
differences, thereby expanding our descriptive grip on mathematical reasoning practices. 
Once we have understood folding as a mathematical reasoning practice we can inquire if 
folding paper enables a mathematical culture, how it could do so and what this may mean for 
our understanding of the term “mathematical culture”. 
 
Mathematical reasoning practices have received some philosophical attention in recent 
years. One focus has been the role of two-dimensional, drawn diagrams and sketches. 
Kenneth Manders’ seminal paper “The Euclidean Diagram”, written in 1995, begins as 
follows:  
 
“In Euclidean geometry, a diagram has standing to license inference, just as do 
relationships recognized in the text. It is now commonly held that this is a defect 
of rigor.” (Manders 2008, p. 80) 
 
 In his article, Manders argues that the rigor of Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning is, in 
fact, not defect. Other publications have appeared that aim to do for other diagrammatic 
                                                          
4 Reasoning by folding can thus solve mathematical puzzles that are not solvable by purely Euclidean 
straightedge and compass constructions. However, to our knowledge folding has never solved a mathematical 
puzzle that is not solvable by the formal-symbolic means of today. 
5 See (Larvor 2017). Explicitly, by the first three postulates we mean the following:  1. A straight-line segment 
can be drawn joining any two points.  2. Any straight-line segment can be extended indefinitely in a straight 
line.  3. Given any straight-line segment, a circle can be drawn having the segment as radius and one 
endpoint as center. 
6 See for example (Livingston 2008), esp. chapters 11 & 12. 
7 See for example: (Demaine et al 1999). 
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reasoning practices in mathematics what Manders has done for the Euclidean diagram; (Carter 
2010), (De Toffoli and Giardino 2014, 2016). This has bearing on the debate about validity 
and rigor in mathematical proofs. Manders’ account and the subsequent works in history and 
philosophy of mathematical practices have challenged the view that diagrammatic reasoning 
can be translated and reduced completely into propositional, formalistic reasoning. These 
works challenge 20th century modernism “with its preference for general theory, symbolic 
formalism, and the treatment of mathematical theories as worlds of their own without any 
immediate relation to the physical world around us”, being closely related to the “the neglect 
of 3-D models (and 2-D diagrams) during most of the twentieth century.” (Mehrtens 2004, p. 
278)   
 According to De Toffoli and Giardino, diagrammatic reasoning is to be viewed as 
essentially informal in the sense that its ‘translation’ to syntactical propositions distorts the 
knowledge transmitted through it; formalizing diagrammatic reasoning not only alters the 
arguments made via the diagrams but also changes what the reasoning acts on. In contrast to 
the diagrammatic reasoning, reasoning by folding, especially from the end of the 19th century 
onwards, has developed alongside the formalization of mathematical reasoning. We will 
highlight the interplay between formal and informal reasoning idioms in the folding practice. 
Folding is not essentially informal in the sense which the above-mentioned scholars attribute 
to diagrammatic reasoning, in part because, as we will show, the practitioners of the folding 
practice sometimes reason in a fully propositional-syntactic reasoning idiom.   
The differences between diagrammatic reasoning and folding based reasoning cannot 
be reduced to the different approaches concerning formalization. To emphasize, the crease-
diagram is only an end-product of an inferential process when reasoning by folding. The 
haptic dimension of moving the two-dimensional plane depicted in the crease-diagram8 
through three-dimensional space to align points and lines plays a fundamental role in the 
epistemic force of proofs by folding. Folding, we will argue, is not a diagrammatic reasoning 
practice, since the rationality of a folding proof is carried, in part, by the process of folding the 
crease-diagram. It is also not a purely propositional reasoning practice. We suggest naming it 
by the source of its epistemic force: a material reasoning practice. This practice is what 
stands, as we aim to show, at the basis of a mathematical culture of folding.  
 
Let us briefly review the structure of our paper. Section 2 gives some preliminary 
thoughts on practices, which will guide the discussion and suggest why folding is a 
mathematical reasoning practice. We present a brief survey of the history of paper folding, 
concentrating mainly (but not solely) on the first third of the 20th century, starting from 
Tandalam Sundara Row’s 1893 book Geometrical exercises in paper folding.   
In section 3 we discuss how mathematicians practise folding. We discuss three 
examples to make visible how the haptic operations of folding and symbolic-propositional 
idioms interact when reasoning via paper folding.  
We engage in section 4 in more detail with the basic actions of reasoning by paper 
folding. We discuss the basic folding operations and draw attention to how the 
mathematicians came to know them, showing that the permissible inference steps of reasoning 
                                                          
8 Three-dimensional paper depicts a two-dimensional plane in an instance of idealization. For more on 
idealizations in the folding practice, see section 4.1. 
 by paper folding are not given to us propositionally at the outset and that inquiring what these 
permissible inferential steps are is part of the practice. 
In section 5 we move to a discussion of the epistemic force of proofs by folding. We 
present Giaquinto’s ahistorical account of this epistemic force as a means to access the 
interplay of reasoning idioms one finds in the folding practice. 
Bringing together the insights of the earlier sections, section 6 argues that folding is a 
material reasoning practice. We highlight some differences with other non-propositional 
reasoning practices that have been discussed in the literature. We argue that, unlike in the 
cases of diagrammatic reasoning, in the case of paper folding the physical realities of the 
material reasoned on ensure the epistemic force of arguments. 
Having clarified the questions concerning practices, we turn to the question of 
mathematical cultures and folding in section 7. We deal directly with the culture terminology 
and draw attention to discontinuities of folding as a culture with some classical 
understandings of the term. Rather than arguing that folding based geometry is or is not a 
mathematical culture, we propose to learn from our contemplations that mathematical cultures 
need not be based on shared beliefs but rather on shared practices. 9  
 
 
2  Paper folding as a mathematical practice: short historical review 
 
Part of our aim is to inquire what structures folding as a reasoning practice and how reasoning 
in this practice is carried out. But before doing that, we need to tackle the question whether 
one can meaningfully speak about a practice of paper folding. 
 De Toffoli and Giardino (2016, p. 28) give us a three-item list of what a philosophy of 
mathematical practice should investigate. From this we take that a mathematical practice is a 
human activity, which contains a collective dimension in the sense that a mathematical 
community exists, certain mathematical capacities are enhanced via this activity and material 
representations are being used. While the last aspect is obvious with respect to paper folding, 
the first and the second require elaboration. Hence, we will give in this section a brief 
historical survey of folding to argue that folding is a mathematical practice. A full blown 
historical analysis of the development of mathematical paper folding, starting from the 16th 
century till the end of the 20th century, can be found in A History of Folding in Mathematics: 
Mathematizing the Margins (Friedman 2018a). Here we will review only the main 
mathematicians working in the late 19th century and the 20th century.  
 Joseph Rouse notes that there should be sufficiently many practitioners for folding to 
be considered as a practice: 
 
Practices are patterns of activity in response to a situation. Practices are dynamic, 
because these patterns exist only through being continually reproduced. Their 
coherence and continuity thus depend both on coordination among multiple 
participants and things and on the maintenance of that coordination over time. (Rouse 
1996, p. 26, emphasis added)  
                                                          
9 Having motivated our philosophical interest in folding, allow us now to point out the joy that comes with paper 
folding. We invite our readers to read this paper with a sheet of semi- transparent paper (baking paper works 
nicely) and a pencil to hand to perform some of the folding we will discuss in later sections. 
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To show the existence of the “multiple participants”, i.e. of a community of mathematicians 
who practised folding in their work, we begin our discussion in 1893. In this year, the Indian 
mathematician Tandalam Sundara Row published his book Geometrical Exercises in Paper 
Folding (Row 1893), presenting many exercises and theorems that can be solved and proved 
using solely the means of paper folding. In fact, Row attempted to base all of plane geometry 
on operations stemming from folding.10 Row wrote: 
 
The teaching of Euclid in schools can be made very interesting by the free use of the 
kindergarten gifts. It would be perfectly legitimate to require pupils to fold the 
diagrams on paper. This would give [the children] neat and accurate figures, and 
impress the truth of the propositions forcibly on their minds. It would not be necessary 
to take any statement on trust. (Row 1893, p. ii) 
 
Row suggests that there would not be any need to consider axioms as an unprovable basis 
without justification (the “statement on trust”). Row also indicates his sources of influence: he 
starts the introduction of his book by referring to kindergarten gifts. This indicates that Row 
was inspired by the exercises and playful objects given to children at the kindergartens of 
Friedrich Fröbel (called “gifts and occupations”); indeed, Row indicates that “[t]he idea of 
this book was suggested to me by Kindergarten Gift No. 8. –Paper-folding. The gift consists 
of 200 variously coloured squares of paper […] and diagrams and instructions for folding.”11 
But while the Fröbelian exercises were meant for young children, Row took Fröbel’s ideas 
one step further,12 as we will see in more detail in section 4.1. Indeed, in his book, Row did 
not only construct via folding several regular polygons, but also dealt with arithmetic, 
geometric, and harmonic series, properties related to the concurrence of lines and more 
importantly – the construction of conic sections and other curves of higher degree.13 
 Row’s book became influential. Two years after the publication of the book, Felix 
Klein mentions it in his 1895 book Vorträge über ausgewählte Fragen der 
Elementargeometrie:14 
 
“[…] a Hindu mathematician, Sundara Row, of Madras, published a little book 
Geometrical Exercises in Paper Folding, in which [this] idea is considerably 
developed. The author shows how by paper folding we may construct by points such 
curves as the ellipse, etc.”15 
 
                                                          
10   For a survey on Row’s work and on Hermann Wiener’s work, another mathematician who worked with 
folded models in 1893, see: (Friedman 2016). 
11   (Row 1893, p. i). Note that Eleonore Heerwart, an influential educator who helped spreading the Fröbelian 
ideas in Great Britain in the second half of the 19th century, numbered paper folding as gift num. 8 (Friedman 
2018a, p. 239). The Fröbelian ideas came to India in the wake of Great Britain’s colonization activities, which 
indicates how Row may have encountered them. See: (Friedman 2018a, p. 247–250). 
12   See also: (Friedman 2018a, p. 254–265). 
13   By this we mean that by using folding techniques Row was able to construct an infinite number of points that 
lie on the given curve, hence constructing the curve as the geometrical place of these points. Obviously, the only 
curve that can be constructed without gaps with paper folding is a line. 
14   It is still not clear how Klein obtained Row’s book. 
15  (Klein 1895, p. 33). The translation is taken from (Klein 1897, p. 42). 
 Klein’s book was translated in 1897 to English and his remark has sparked an interest, 
causing a republication of Row’s book in the USA by Wooster Woodruff Beman and David 
Eugene Smith. In 1901 a new edition of Row’s book was published in Chicago as (Row 
1901), where the editors remark that they were enthusiastic regarding the novel methods 
presented there. 
 Row’s book and its re-publication have caused a popularization of the 
mathematization of paper folding. Several mathematicians were influenced by his work and 
tried to advance it further. For example, Wilhelm Ahrens (1872–1927), Adolf Hurwitz (1859–
1919), and C. A. Rupp were all influenced by Row’s work. Each placed folding in a different 
mathematical culture and domain: Ahrens in recreational mathematics, in his 1901 book 
Mathematische Unterhaltungen und Spiele (Ahrens 1901); Hurwitz, emphasizing in his 
private diaries the constructions which can be made with folding;16 and Rupp, investigating 
envelopes of curves in his 1924 paper “On a Transformation by Paper Folding.” (Rupp 1924). 
Another work – the 1905 book A First Book of Geometry of Grace Chisholm Young and 
William Young – took a less favorable approach to Row’s work (Young and Young 1905). 
This book clarifies, in contrast to Row, the distinction between the fold as operation and the 
(Euclidean) geometrical axioms. The fact that the book was quite popular in Europe also 
helped spreading folding as mathematical practice. 
 It was however with the work of the Italian mathematician Margherita Piazzolla 
Beloch (1872–1976), who was familiar with Row’s work as well as with Rupp’s paper, that a 
breakthrough occurred. Her work showed that certain constructions can be obtained via 
folding-based geometry, while the same constructions are not obtainable by straightedge and 
compass constructions alone.17 Beloch showed that one of the Delian problems – doubling the 
cube, which boils down to constructing a segment whose length is the third root of 2 –18 can 
be solved by paper folding. Beloch’s fundamental insight in her paper (1934) was that the 
following operation can always be performed,19 for any two points P1 and P2 and two lines l1 
and l2: 
 
Beloch fold: Given two points P1 and P2 and two lines l1 and l2 one can make a single 
fold that places P1 onto l1 and P2 onto l2 simultaneously. 
 
We will return to Beloch’s folding below, but it will already be helpful here to examine how 
she constructed a segment whose length is 3√2. Beloch took the points A = (-1,0) and B = (0,-
2) and folded them onto the lines x=1 and y=2 respectively. She then proved that the 
intersection of the obtained crease (the dotted line in figure 1) with the y-axis is the point C = 
(0,3√2).20 
                                                          
16  On Hurwitz work on folding, see: (Oswald 2015). On the connection between Ahrens and Hurwitz 
conceptions of folding, see also (Friedman 2018a, p. 273–282). 
17   See (Hull 2011). See also (Friedman 2018a, p. 323–327). 
18 To double the volume of a cube of side-length 1 one needs to construct a cube of side-length third root of 2. 
19 Note that Beloch’s claim, that the operation can always be performed, requires the piece of paper to be 
indefinitely large.  We discuss this requirement in Section 4.1 
20 To see this, we follow the argument in (Hull 2011, pp. 310-311): Denote by M the intersection of the fold with 
the x-axis. Using properties of similar triangles, we obtain:  
 
 |OC| / |OA| = |OM| / |OC| = |OB| / |OM| 
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Figure 1: Beloch’s construction on the third root of 2. (figure drawn by M.F.) 
 
Today, Beloch's 1934 constructions are seen as a mathematical breakthrough. However, at the 
time they were ignored and forgotten21 and were only rediscovered by Humiaki Huzita (1924-
2005) in the middle of the 80s of the 20th century. They were republished in the 1989 
conference proceedings “The First International Meeting of Origami Science and 
Technology”. In these proceedings, Huzita and Jacques Justin published their own works on 
fundamental operations of folding based geometry; (Justin 1989 [1986]), (Huzita 1989). 
Other mathematicians, such as Emma Frigerio and Benedetto Scimemi also published in these 
proceedings important papers on this subject and on Beloch’s work; (Friegerio and Huzita 
1989), (Huzita and Scimeni 1989). 
 Our historical account reveals that folding has, after Row’s seminal book, attracted 
sufficient attention for a community to form. The interests of the actors that led to this 
community forming are diverse. Row was interested in school teaching; Beloch was interested 
in the force of the mathematical constructions possible with folding (doubling the cube); 
Justin and Huzita were interested in many kinds of paper-folding (such as origami) and 
mathematical paper folding in the sense of this article was just part of this.  
 Rouse stressed “Practices are patterns of activity in response to a situation” (see 
citation above). The situation brought about by paper and the method of line and point 
constructions via folding is still with us. Some research mathematicians investigate the kind 
of contemporary questions that arise from the folding situation.22 Paper is also still folded as 
part of recreational and educational mathematics.23 Folding lives on as a mathematical 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 Substituting |OA| = 1 and |OB| = 2 we obtain:  
 
 |OC| = |OM| / |OC| = 2 / |OM| 
 
 Hence 
 
 |OC|3 = |OC| . |OM| / |OC| . 2 / |OM| = 2 
 
21 The reasons for this ignorance are beyond the scope of this article. For a detailed analysis of these reasons see: 
(Friedman 2018a, p. 336–340). 
22 Examples include (Bern and Hayes 1996), (Bern et al. 2003), (Demaine and O’Rourke 2007) and (Alperin and 
Lang 2009). 
23 See for example Vi Hart’s famous video on YouTube from 2011 on the proof of the Pythagorean theorem via 
folding (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z6lL83wl31E) and Matthew Stone and Una Stojnic analysis of it 
(Stone and Stojnic 2015). 
 practice because there are patterns of activity in response to the situation encountered in paper 
folding. 
 The above non-exhaustive survey, concentrating mainly on the first decades of the 20th 
century, shows the existence of a mathematical community dealing mathematically with paper 
folding, starting (at least) from the 19th century. These mathematicians were taking part in a 
cooperative effort; indeed, for Manders, “at its most basic, a mathematical practice is a 
structure for cooperative effort in control” of communal mathematical activities; (Manders 
2008, p. 82).24 This resonates with Rouse’s statement, that: “what scientists share is not a 
background of beliefs but a situation that they may belong to and understand in partially 
different ways” (Rouse 1996, p. 27).25 We will argue that for folding this controlling structure 
(or situation) is given largely by the physical realities of paper. We say ‘largely’ here because, 
as we will see, the arguments for generality of some folds and folding operations given by the 
mathematicians rely on other mathematical idioms, practices and traditions. These matters 
will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. An investigation how this structure 
controls and regulates the activities of the mathematicians extends over sections 4 and 5. 
Viewed in this light, our argument that folding is a practice only ends with the end of this 
article.  
Before turning to a more philosophical analysis, we need to look more closely at a few 
case studies. 
 
 
3 Three case studies 
  
In this section we provide three short case studies on how reasoning by folding was done. 
Two are taken from Row, one is due to Beloch. Our aim is twofold. First, this section will 
provide the reader with insights on how folding was practised. As we will see, Row and 
Beloch practised folding in very different ways. Second, we will use the discussion of our 
case studies to draw out two features of reasoning via paper folding – idealization and 
generalization – which will be philosophically analyzed in the next sections. 
 
3.1 Row’s geometric series 
 
Row starts his book with the folding of a square from a piece of paper of any shape.26 To 
obtain such a square Row takes any piece of paper, folds it upon itself, thus obtaining a 
crease. Folding the crease onto itself, he obtains a second crease, which is perpendicular to the 
first one. Continuing in that way to form more perpendicular creases, he obtains a rectangle; 
indeed, for Row, “by superposition, it is proved that […] the two long sides [of the rectangle] 
are equal, and so also are the two short sides.” (Row 1893, pp 1-2) We consider what can be 
either proved or read off from a crease diagram in section 5.1. 
 Row now performs the decisive step: “Now take this rectangular piece of paper, and 
                                                          
24  For the diagrammatic reasoning, an example of this control is, according the Manders, that “practice has to 
control the production of diagrams and provide for resolution of disagreement among judgments based on their 
appearances” (ibid., p. 91). 
25  See also (Netz 2017) on this theme. See (Netz 1999) for a full account. 
26 To stress the point: Row’s argument clarifies that mathematical folding does not require standardized shapes 
of paper. 
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fold it obliquely so that one of the short sides falls upon one of the longer sides. Then fold and 
remove the portion which overlaps. Unfolding the sheet, we find that it is now square, i.e., its 
four angles are right angles, and all its sides are equal.” (p. 2) For what follows, the length of 
these sides is considered to be 1. Row then folds along the second diagonal of the square, 
noting that the point of intersection of the two diagonals is the mid-point of the square (p. 5). 
By folding each pair of parallel edges on its opposite side, Row obtains four smaller squares. 
He then folds “through the corners of the smaller squares, [...] [to] obtain a square [which] is 
half the larger square, and has the same center” (p. 4).27 With “the corners of the smaller 
squares” Row means the corners lying on the middle of the edges of the large square. With 
this smaller square Row performs the same procedure of folding the corners onto its center, 
obtaining now a square whose area is ¼. Performing this procedure again and again, he 
concludes: 
 
“Each square leaves 1/2 of the next larger square, i.e., the four triangles left from each square are 
together equal to half of it. The sums of all these triangles increased to any number cannot exceed the 
original square, and they must eventually absorb the whole of it.” (Row 1893, pp. 4-5) 
 
Since the sum of the areas of the folded triangles is eventually equal to the area of the whole 
original square, one obtains the following formula: 0.5 + 0.25 + 0.125 + … = 1. Row 
considers this to be a proof by folding of an infinite sum; see figure 2 for Row’s crease-
diagram after the third stage. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Row’s square paper after three consecutive folds; (Row 1893, p. 4) 
 
  
 Notice that for Row there is no need to justify his formula via an algebraic-symbolic 
reasoning. The evidence of the convergence of Row’s geometric series is provided via 
folding, and it does not rely on other mathematical practices or traditions (such as algebra); 
(Row 1893, pp. 4-5). As we will see below, not all mathematicians who reason by paper 
folding follow Row in this. That Row sees no need to further justify the convergence of the 
                                                          
27 Note that this step this is similar to what Giaquinto considers while discussing folding as proof practice; see: 
(Giaquinto 2007, p. 51), though he does not mention Row. We will return to the differences between Row’s and 
Giaquinto’s approach later (see section 5). Notice here that whilst Giaquinto also folds through mid-points, 
Row’s prior folding operations have constructed these mid-points. 
 series indicates that he regards folding not just a means of acquiring a belief28 but as a valid 
form of reasoning. That reasoning by folding can be more than a mere means to acquire 
beliefs has been challenged by Giaquinto who, roughly, argues that folding is not exact 
enough to carry validity. We will engage with this issue in section 5. 
 
 
3.2 Row’s construction of the parabola 
 
To further understand the reasoning underlying folding, we now turn to Row’s connection 
between folding and outlining a parabola. Explicitly, given a line l and a point S not on l (both 
given on a piece of paper), the various foldings of the line l onto S create creases which are 
tangent to the same parabola (see figure 3; the line l is in figure 3 the bottom edge of the 
square); the obtained parabola has as a directrix the line l and as a focus the point S, or, 
formulated otherwise, this parabola is the envelope29 of these creases; Row does not use this 
terminology, although it was well known during his time.  
 
Figure 3: Row’s drawing of a folding tangent to a parabola as in (Row 1893, p. 88) 
 
Row explains this connection as follows:  
 
“The above figure shows how a parabola can be marked on paper. The edge of the square XF is the 
directrix, A the vertex, and S the focus. Fold through XAS and obtain the axis. Divide the upper half of 
the square into a number of sections by lines parallel to the axis. These lines meet the directrix in a 
number of points. Fold by laying each of these points on the focus and mark the point where the 
corresponding horizontal line is cut. The points thus obtained lie on a parabola. The folding gives also 
the tangent to the curve at the point, e.g., PF.” (Row 1893, p. 88) 
 
In modern notation, if the point X (in figure 3) is (0,0) and the point S is (0,a) then the 
equation of the parabola is y=x2+a/2. Once again, the reasoning here is material: Row notes 
that the “parabola can be marked on paper”. He uses the algebraic definition of the parabola 
as the set of all points, such that for any point P the distance |PF| to a fixed point F, called the 
focus, is equal to the distance |Pl| to a fixed line l, called the directrix. This definition enables 
Row to construct a set of points lying on the parabola materially via folding. 
 
                                                          
28  We refer here to Giaquinto’s terms “evidence-providing” and “non-evidential” (Giaquinto 2007, p. 67). We 
come back to Giaquinto in the next sections. 
29  An envelope of a family of curves in the plane is a curve that is tangent to each member of the family at some 
point. 
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3.3 Beloch’s fold  
 
Having seen in the former subsection that folding a point on a line is equivalent to finding a 
tangent to a parabola, we will now show how Beloch used a multiplicity of practices and types 
of reasoning to justify the general existence of her fold (cf. section 1). These practices, we 
claim, were interwoven for Beloch. Using what we learned from Row in the last section and 
switching freely between reasoning idioms, we can see that proving that folding two different 
points on two different lines is always possible is equivalent to proving that a common 
tangent to two parabolas always exists. As Beloch mentioned in her 1934 article, given two 
points and two lines “it is enough […] to fold the paper” in such and such way to find the 
desired (Beloch) fold, or that alternatively the “explained operation may be done with the 
same ease and accuracy with an ordinary drawing”; (Beloch 1934, p. 187). That is, for private 
cases, one may manipulate paper to see that the fold can indeed be performed. However, to 
justify the general case, i.e. that folding two different points on two different lines is always 
possible – Beloch turns towards another reasoning practice, based on computations from 
analytic geometry.30   
 As we have seen above, one can construct a parabola from a given line and a point not 
lying on the line. Row had already connected this insight to folding, as we saw in the last 
subsection. Beloch realized that she could use this connection to folding together with a 
theorem from analytic geometry to argue that what we now call the Beloch fold can always be 
performed. The theorem is that any two parabolas have at least one common tangent. 
Beloch’s ingenious insight was that this common tangent is precisely the fold which folds the 
two points onto the two lines as described in the Beloch fold. That this insight holds true 
requires proving, which Beloch did in the reasoning idioms of analytic geometry that were 
standard in her time. 
 This episode shows the ease with which Beloch moves between manual operations and 
symbolic idioms. This shows us something important about folding as a reasoning practice: 
reasoning by paper folding is multi-faceted and the reasoning idioms used intertwine in 
practice. When we claim that folding is a material reasoning practice we thus do not claim 
that all epistemic force of a proof by paper folding stems solely from the folds that can 
possibly be carried out on the material. Rather, what can possibly be folded using the material 
plays an important, but not the only, role in carrying epistemic force by, as we will argue, 
constraining allowed reasoning steps. 
 This episode also shows that mathematicians were interested whether certain folding 
actions can always be carried out. Indeed, Beloch's focus in her papers is on justifying why a 
certain fold – the Beloch fold – is an action, which can be carried out in general in the folding 
idiom. That this fold doubles the cube is presented as a side-product. Compare this to the 
simpler operation of folding any given generic point on any given generic line. Its general 
execution is evident without the need to justify it via a turn to another type of reasoning. That 
is, it is evident that this operation can always be performed and need not be proved via other 
means. And while for the Beloch fold – folding any two given generic points on any two 
given generic lines – the reasoning behind this execution is based on an interplay of material 
                                                          
30“Since two parabolas have three common tangents, the problem admits three solutions, including certain real 
solutions.” (Beloch 1934, p. 187). 
 and propositional idioms stemming from analytic geometry, this might not be the case for 
more complicated versions of this operation. Indeed, the operation of folding three different 
points on three different lines is equivalent to finding a common tangent to three parabolas. 
But this tangent exists only in special cases. Justifying this general non-existence can be done 
only via reasoning stemming from analytic geometry, for example, but not from folding paper 
alone.  
 
 
4 Generic folding actions 
 
 In the last section we drew attention to some features of reasoning by folding as it 
occurs in practice. We saw how Row's proof of an infinite sum asked us to ignore physical 
limitations such as how often a piece of paper can be folded. These are matters of idealization 
and we deal with them in the next subsection. We also met Beloch who took seriously the 
question whether certain folds can always be carried out. Such questions of generality are 
taken up in subsection 4.2. These issues of idealization and generality are questions about the 
structure of control at play in the folding practice. What provides this structure of control of 
this practice and how is it regulated? At this point, we have met the major players who 
practised folding mathematically, know about their motivations and works and have 
convinced ourselves that folding can be reasonably called a practice. Our next step is to 
investigate the nature of the Rouseian situation of the mathematicians who practise folding. 
Or, to put it into Manders’ words, what provides the structure of control in the folding 
practice? 
 A preliminary naive answer to our leading question already covers much ground: the 
mathematicians are in the situation that they are folding paper31 to construct lines. The 
physical realities of paper restrict and justify how lines can be constructed by folding. To put 
it in a slogan: if you can fold it,32 then you can construct it.33 Because these constructions play 
an epistemic role in proofs by folding, the physical realities of paper control the permissible 
inferential actions in proofs by folding. And that is to say that the physical realities of paper 
provide a controlling structure in Manders’ sense. Similarly, the mathematicians share the 
situation brought about by the physical realities of paper when folded. Thus, the physical 
realities of the material used justify and control the permissible inferential actions in 
arguments by folding. 
 This naive answer covers much ground because it correctly highlights the controlling 
effects of the material. The allowed moves – such as folding a point on a given line or folding 
two different points on two different lines – are not given in axiomatic form (even though 
                                                          
31   For ease of exposition, we will assume that the mathematicians fold paper. They could fold any other 
material that behaves similar to paper when folded, such as papyrus, tin-foil, etc. 
32 Livingston (2008) includes an insightful discussion of the difficulties involved in performing an origami-fold 
from some given instructions. Paper folding in the sense of this paper faces similar difficulties - it is not easy 
to fold, say, a point onto a line, especially if the paper is not see-through. The mathematicians practicing 
paper-folding did not discuss these issues and neither will we do so here. The “you” in  the above slogan “if 
you can fold it” thus refers to a skilled practitioner equipped with adequate material. 
33 Notice the difference to Euclidean practice where not all drawings on paper are permissible constructions. 
Examples of non-permissible drawing in Euclidean practice include free-hand drawings, moving ruler 
constructions, Nicomedes chonoid etc. (see (Bos 2001) for a discussion of some of these).   
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they were later axiomatized),34 but are permissible because they can be performed on paper. 
This means that the permissible moves of reasoning by paper folding can be discovered by 
handling the material – for example, Beloch discovered the Beloch-fold. This is quite 
different from the propositional-symbolic geometric practices in which the allowed 
constructive moves are given by axioms or propositions before any reasoning is carried out; 
more on this in the section 6 of this article.  
 This points also to a similarity between a different diagrammatic practice and paper 
folding. Knot diagrams can visualize motion or constructions; (Giaquinto 2007, p. 263). De 
Toffoli and Giardino present knot diagrams as dynamic due, for example, to the visualization 
of the possible Reidemeister moves, indicating that the diagrams involve “visualizing 
motion”; (De Toffoli and Giardino 2014, pp. 839-841). Paper folding can also be thought as 
“visualized motion” since all the basic operations of folding point towards the possibility of 
visualizing them in the mind, rather than performing them in a haptic manner. However, this 
haptic quality is present in the proofs by folding as they appear in the practice; see e.g. our 
discussion of Row above. We will argue that this haptic dimension of manipulating a physical 
sheet of paper adds to the epistemic force of proofs by folding by providing correctives for 
errors of visualization. 
 The above answer to the question of what provides a structure of control for the 
folding practice is naive because it is simply not true that all constructive moves in folding are 
justified solely by the physical realities of paper. First, although lines are created as creases, 
points are sometimes regarded as resulting from intersection points of two creases,35 but may 
also be considered as basic objects, which are already given, i.e. not created from any basic 
folding operation.36 Second, recall here Beloch who argued at length that a certain fold can 
generally be performed. It is true that if you cannot fold something in principle, then the move 
is not allowed in the folding reasoning practice. However, if one can fold a certain crease in a 
particular case, what guarantees that such a move can always be made? Our naive answer 
overlooks these questions of generality. 
 Our naive answer also overlooks the issues of idealization we drew attention to when 
presenting Row's folding of the geometric series. We will deal with this issue first, because it 
can be dealt with quickly, and then move on to the more serious worries about generalization. 
This will make the structure that provides control in the folding practice visible. We then 
move to questions about the epistemic strength of this structure. 
 
4.1 Idealization 
 
 When reasoning by folding, just as in diagrammatic reasoning, we never run out of 
space. This suggests that the physical realities of paper provide a structure for control, not the 
physical reality of the actual sheet of paper used. To see this, let us consider the example 
presented in the introduction. We know by now that given a line and a point on a paper, we 
                                                          
34 With Justin’s and Huzita’s works. 
35 “The point of intersection of the diagonals is called the center of the square” (Row 1893, p. 3) 
36 See for example section 4.2, for Justin’s list of the seven basic operations. One may claim that new points can 
be marked as a result of basic operations, but these new points result from folding already given points. Note 
that (new) points can be obtained as a result of folding given points onto a  new location (e.g. folding a point 
on a line, thus obtaining a point on a line); they can be also obtained as a “point of a crease”; for example: 
halving the segment AB by folding A onto B gives you a point C in the middle of AB. 
 can fold a perpendicular to the line that hits the point. But can we always do this? Take an A4 
sheet of paper and make a tiny fold that cuts across the bottom right corner. Now consider a 
point in the bottom left corner. The perpendicular to the line that hits this point lies largely 
outside of the paper. The physical realities of sheets of paper are such that they are finite in 
length. In what sense can we then still fold the perpendicular in this case? Are we not 
constrained by these physical realities in such a way that we simply cannot? The 
mathematicians have ignored this problem. The implicit assumption is that would we have 
folded ‘more smartly’ or used a larger sheet of paper (or both), we could have made it so that 
we can fold the desired perpendicular. Just as in Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning, we never 
run out of space when reasoning by paper folding. 
 We saw a similar kind of idealization with Row’s infinite series. Row did not concern 
himself with what is physically possible. He allowed folding to be abstract even though he 
aims to “forceably impress the truth” on our minds. What matters, we suggest, are not the 
limitations of any given sheet of paper but rather what fold the physical realities of paper 
permit. By this we mean that when what limits the performability of certain folding 
constructions are certain details about the particular, physical sheet of paper that is used, then 
one can ignore these limitations; examples include the size of the sheet, its shape and 
thickness. When reasoning by folding, sheets of paper are always sufficiently large, the 
folding diagram is always suitably arranged, the paper can be folded multiple times and so on. 
Looking at the history of the practice, the limitations that arise from the physical realities of a 
particular sheet of paper were ignored by the mathematicians. As we will draw out in the next 
subsection, the limitations that arise from the physical realities of paper (rather than a sheet of 
paper) on the other hand play a fundamental role for folding as a reasoning practice.   
 Besides idealizing away problems that could arise from a particular sheet of paper, the 
mathematicians who practised folding also largely ignored questions of competency for 
precise folding. How to hold a piece of paper? Hold to fold it such that the created crease is 
straight rather than rugged? How to align points and lines? These haptic motions require skill. 
Mastery does not come from merely observing others or being told how it is done but requires 
training. These embodied aspects of reasoning by folding are ignored in the practice and 
practitioners are assumed to be capable of performing the required folds with expert precision. 
For the sake of focus in our paper, we will follow suit and leave a discussion of the embodied 
aspects of reasoning by folding to a later point in time. Our focus is on reasoning, not on 
mastery of haptic motion. 
We argue that folding is a material reasoning practice. The above points about 
idealization reveal that, despite its material nature, reasoning by folding requires some, albeit 
limited, abstractions. This insight helps to clarify a possible misunderstanding. When we call 
reasoning by folding material, we do not mean that the reasoning can always be performed on 
the material; lines and points can “fall off” a given sheet of paper and folding operations can 
be carried out to different degrees of excellency. Rather, as mentioned, we mean that the 
epistemic force of reasoning by folding stems from the material. It is part of the aim of the 
following sections to draw out what we mean by this. 
 
4.2 Permissible folding actions and their generality  
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We saw already that Beloch was much concerned with the question whether a certain fold 
could always be carried out. She was not alone in this. Huzita and Scimemi give a list of what 
they conceive of as a “set of fundamental operations ...[which] will be universally accepted”; 
(Huzita and Scimeni 1989, p. 216). Of particular interest to us is the following operation: 
 
(*) given a line L, a fixed point F and another point P. Fold such that F stays in place 
and P ends up on L. (Huzita and Scimeni 1989, p. 216)  
 
To see whether this operation is indeed a general one, i.e. can be performed for any 
configuration of two points and a line, the reader should try this herself. Fix two points, F and 
P, and a line L close enough to P. Now fold such that P ends up on L and the fold runs 
through F. This is usually fairly easy to do. However, arrange the points so that L does not cut 
the circle around F with radius |FP|. Folds that run through F can put P anywhere on this 
circle, but since L does not cut this circle, it is impossible in this configuration to fold as 
required in operation (*). In their paper, Huzita and Scimemi (1989) do not notice this. We 
see here that one must clarify under which conditions a folding operation can indeed be 
generally performed.  
 Jacques Justin gave in his 1989 paper “Résolution par le pliage de l'équation du 
troisième degré et applications géométriques” a list of seven basic, general folding operations; 
by “basic operation” we mean an operation which cannot be reduced to any other sequences 
of folding operations and which can always be performed, assuming that the points and lines 
are given in what we will call “generic position” (with the possible exception of operation 
(*)). By this we mean an arrangement of points and lines with only minor caveats (e.g. “lines 
are not parallel”, “points are not on lines” etc.). It will be helpful to work our way through the 
list of basic folding operations, asking our question why the operation can be carried out in 
general.37 For Justin, the Ps denote points, Ds denote lines and → denotes ‘‘ends up folded 
onto.’’ The operations are as follows; (Justin 1989 [1986], p. 257): 
 
1. P → P, P’  → P’ (fold along a crease going over two points)  
2. P → P’ (fold a point P on another point P’)  
3. P → P , D → D (fold along a crease perpendicular to D that passes through P) 
4. P → D, D’  → D’ (folding P on D while folding D’ on itself)  
5. D → D’ (fold a line D on another line D’) 
6. P → D, P’  → P’ (operation (*) as above)  
7. P → D, P’  → D’ (folding two different points on two different lines) 38 
 
Operation 1 connects to the Euclidean basic operation of drawing a line segment through any 
two given points. That this is always possible, no matter how the points are arranged, was 
postulated by Euclid as proposition 1. In the folding practice, this is presented as an evident 
truth about what can be folded. 
 That operation 2 can always be performed is also self-evident. Notice however what it 
does. By folding one point onto another we create a crease in the middle between the two 
                                                          
37   Note that Huzita, while also trying to find the fundamental operations of folding, gave in: (Huzita 1989, p. 
144), a list of only 6 fundamental operations and noted that there may be more operations to be added to this list. 
38   Justin also gave in his paper a list of restrictions on these operations. 
 points. Given the former crease, that connects the two points, we have thus created a second 
crease that is perpendicular to and halves the (imagined or folded) line segment connecting 
the two points. Euclid needed an argument to show that his basic operations allowed such 
constructions. Indeed, it is, prior to its proof, not evident that ruler and compass constructions 
could construct such a line segment – this is why Euclid had to prove it. That is, unlike 
operation 1, which mirrored a basic Euclidean construction, operation 2 does not mirror a 
basic Euclidean construction. 
 We used the self-evidence of the general performability of operation 3 to illustrate 
how one can do geometry by paper folding in our introduction. Like operation 2, operation 3 
is not mirrored by the three basic Euclidean constructions. 
 Operation 4 is not self-evident. First off, we are asked to fold such that the line D’ 
ends up on itself. Similar to operation 3 we may think of this as folding D’ onto itself, thus 
creating a crease perpendicular to it. However, it seems also possible to crease the paper along 
D’ as this does not move the line. In fact, in some cases for operation 4, this is precisely how 
one must fold in order to perform the action described by operation 4. This leads to a second 
point about operation 4: it cannot always be performed. Considering two parallel lines D and 
D’ it is fairly easy to arrange the point P on the paper in such a way that P cannot be folded 
onto D in the desired way (when D and D’ are close to each other and P is far away from the 
lines for example). Justin notices this and demands in his list of operations that D and D’ not 
be parallel. That is, he demands that they are in generic position. Given this constraint39 
operation 4 can be seen as the projection of P onto D along D’. Because such a projection can 
always be performed (under the given constraints), operation 4 can always be performed.  
 That operation 5 can always be performed is again self-evident. In fact, as Justin 
mentions, if D and D’ intersect, then there are two folds that fold D onto D’, each of these 
folds bisecting two of the four angles at the intersection of D and D’. 
 Operation 6 was discussed above, and operation 7 is the Beloch fold. As we saw, that 
such a fold always exists was proven in 1934 by Beloch. However, to prove that such a crease 
always exists, Beloch showed that finding it is equivalent to finding a common tangent to two 
parabolas (cf. section 3 for elaboration). Since the number of common tangents to two 
parabolas is always greater or equal to 1 the crease always exists. Beloch thus shows that a 
certain manual folding operation can be carried out in general by relying on analytical 
algebraic reasoning.  
We have seen that any line can be constructed in the crease-diagram that can be 
obtained from a single fold. “If you can fold it, then you can construct it” was the slogan. In 
this subsection we showed that the mathematicians reasoning by paper folding were 
concerned with the question whether their folds could generally be performed; whether a 
particular case could be elevated to a basic folding operation. Such arguments for the general 
performability of the fold were usually performed in reasoning idioms other than folding; we 
discussed Beloch and her use of the resources of symbolic-propositional analytic geometry. 
To recall: the operation of folding three different points on three different lines can be also 
considered as a permissible operation, however, it is not generally practicable, because if the 
points and lines are in generic position, then there is no crease along which we can perform 
the fold; this is because it would be equivalent to finding a common tangent to three parabolas 
                                                          
39 Justin also adds that P not be on D to avoid trivialities; (Justin 1989, p. 257). 
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in generic position. However, just by trying (unsuccessfully) to fold three given (generic) 
points on three lines, one cannot prove that this operation in fact cannot be performed in 
general. This shows that one aspect of the work done on paper folding is to investigate the 
generality of the permissible constructive moves. These are not given to us at the outset. 
Rather, the generality of the permissible constructive, material moves is discovered and 
proved. With the (re)discovery of the Beloch fold by Huzita and Justin, there seemed to be no 
guarantee that there are no other basic folds that can always be performed but simply have not 
yet been found. Indeed, Huzita and Scimemi note in regard to a list of five fundamental 
operations they give that it should “be noticed [that] those [operations] are obviously not 
listed [sic.] all the possible folding operations” (Huzita and Scimeni 1989, p. 216). The proof 
that the above list of the seven operations is complete was published only in 2009 by Roger 
Alperin and Robert Lang; (Alperin and Lang 2009, pp. 374-377).   
 
5. Permissible inferences 
  
In the last section we showed that several basic folding operations are not obviously 
always performable. Beloch’s work in particular dealt with the question of whether her fold 
can generally be performed. This question is the heart of one reasoning-tradition in the folding 
practice. We will now turn our attention to another reasoning-tradition of this practice: 
proving theorems (such as Row’s proof of the value of the geometric series) and constructing 
shapes (such as Row’s envelop of a parabola) via paper folding. 
The epistemic force of folding proofs has been differently judged. On the one hand, 
the mathematician Row held that folding can “impress the truth” of geometrical propositions 
“forcibly on our minds”. The philosopher Marcus Giaquinto, on the other hand, argues that 
proofs by folding can help us to form a belief, but folding is epistemically too weak to support 
such beliefs on its own. Our analysis of the epistemic force of proofs by folding as they 
appear in practice reveals that it is stronger than Giaquinto realizes, even though it may fall 
short of Row’s hopes. 
Row claimed that proofs by folding “impress the truth” of the theorems “forcibly on 
our minds”. At least superficially, there is some truth to this claim. Proofs by folding have a 
seemingly inescapable immediacy. When we fold a square piece of paper along its diagonal, it 
seems obvious that the resulting two triangles are congruent, for example.40 On second 
thought, however, we realize that the edges of the paper do not perfectly align. Even if we 
folded very precisely, our physical world is messy and edges of a sheet of paper never align 
quite as nicely as they do in abstract mathematical thinking.41 How secure then are arguments 
based on folding proofs? How rigorous are arguments by paper folding? 
It is striking that, as far as the authors are aware, there is not a single folding-proof of 
a statement which, using only operations 1–7, turns out to be incorrect.42 If you can fold it, it 
seems, then other reasoning idioms will not disagree with the result, in the sense that the 
construction cannot be shown – via other idioms – to be impossible. Notice that this is unlike 
diagrammatic reasoning, in which, to give the well-known example, the (incorrect) statement 
                                                          
40 See e.g. (Row 1893, p. 5). 
41 This refers back to the idealization of the embodied aspects of the folding practice, cf. section 4.1. 
42 Note that if one succeeds in folding three different points on three different lines, this does not count as a 
proof, since the points and lines are not generic, hence this “success” holds only for a special case. 
 “every triangle is isosceles” can be “proven”. The would-be proof relies on drawing the 
intersection of certain lines to lie within the triangle even though they should, had one “drawn 
better”, lie outside. This mistake in the inside-outside relation plays a fundamental role in the 
“proof” of the incorrect statement. Row (1893) points to this “fallacy” (p. ix) to motivate 
geometry by paper folding. As he correctly points out, such an incorrect proof cannot be given 
via folding. When folding this “proof”43 the lines will always meet outside of the triangle. 
One cannot “draw badly” when “proving” (i.e. attempting to construct) via folding in the 
same way as one can in diagrammatic proofs.  
The above highlights some of the epistemic strengths of proofs and constructions by 
folding: they are convincing and seem, at least for now, irrefutable. But it does not deal with 
the issue of our messy world. Some basic folding operations44 ask us to align creases in the 
paper. Because our world is messy, we can never perfectly align these creases. How 
trustworthy are arguments based on such imperfections? 
According to Gianquinto (2007), the folded paper alone is not sufficient to discover a 
belief.45 Giaquinto reminds us of the doubt we may have when reasoning on sense experience 
alone. When wondering whether a table fits into a room without the possibility to measure, we 
may think that it fits but are ready to admit that we may be wrong. This feeling that we might 
be wrong is Giaquinto’s clue that there is more involved in proofs by folding than pure sense 
experience. In practice, mathematicians are indeed not relying solely on the sense experience 
obtained from a fold. The folding-proofs Row gave, for example, are not reliant purely on the 
sense experience of the folded paper. They are accompanied by text, which provides 
instructions and guides the reader's focus. As Stone and Stojnic (2015) highlight, such 
guidance of focus may be necessary for folding proofs to function properly.46  
 Giaquinto favors an epistemological account which draws on the concept of cognitive 
states. Folding becomes visualizing in the mind rather than the perception and handling of a 
piece of paper; (Giaquinto 2007, p. 60).47 As Giaquinto correctly points out, beliefs acquired 
by such visualizations of folding may not be reliable. For example, one may fail to correctly 
visualize what one intended to visualize. Such problems do not arise when reasoning as the 
mathematicians do when they actually fold paper. We cannot fail to visualize what we 
intended to visualize when folding paper. The action of folding paper together with the 
resulting crease-diagram does the visualizing for us.  
In particular, Giaquinto did not aim at analyzing folding as a reasoning practice. We 
now return to our analysis of this practice, and return later to Giaquinto’s arguments regarding 
the rigor of reasoning by paper folding.  
In order to deal with folding as a reasoning practice, recall that alignment of lines by 
folding is always imperfect. Euclidean diagrammatic practice faces similar problems. Lines in 
                                                          
43 Or perhaps: a folding-version of this proof. 
44 For example, operation 5 discussed in section 4.2. 
45 e.g. “I will argue that those empirical routes to the belief are not ways of discovering it” (Giaquinto 2007, p. 
52). 
46  “If [folding] demonstrations do have precise content, it can’t just follow from the physical effects of the 
demonstrations alone; there must be other cues that determine the content of the speaker’s argument. These cues 
must help viewers track the features of the demonstration that matter, and help viewers not be distracted by 
features of the demonstration that don’t.” (Stone and Stojnic 2015, pp. 81-82) 
47 As we have seen, this is not how the mathematicians who fold paper reason, i.e. Giaquinto is losing traction 
with actual practice here. Arguably Giaquinto was not interested in folding as a practice but rather in folding as 
an epistemic activity. 
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Euclidean diagrams have widths; certain aspects of these diagrams are unstable under 
perturbation; circles are imperfectly drawn etc. That Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning is 
nonetheless rigorous has been successfully argued by Manders (2008). To recall, a 
fundamental insight of Manders is that not all but only some information may be read off 
diagrams in Euclidean reasoning practice. Manders divides the attributes of a diagram into 
two kinds: exact and co-exact. The exact attributes of a diagram are unstable under 
perturbation. Examples include the lengths of line segments or the width of angles. This kind 
of information is not read off the diagram in Euclidean practice. Co-exact attributes are stable 
under the slight deformations that appear when re-drawing the diagram. Examples include 
inside-outside relations or recognition of regions. Information of this kind is read off diagrams 
in Euclidean practice and relied upon in (textual) argument. The diagram thus stands to 
license certain arguments, and this makes the constructive moves for drawing Euclidean 
diagrams inferential actions. 
Manders’ work is a reconstruction of Euclidean practice, successfully showing that 
this practice was rigorous. Note that the claim is not that the practitioners of Euclidean 
practice thought in terms of exact and co-exact attributes; there is no mention of such terms in 
Euclid's works. Rather, Mander's terminology provides a philosophical framework in which 
the rigor of Euclidean practice can be understood. We aim to do the same for the folding 
practice in this section. 
Giaquinto (2007) asks us to imagine a square piece of paper whose corners we fold to 
its center (p. 51). It is instructive here to read Giaquinto in full, including the figure he draws 
(see figure 4): 
 
“Imagine a square. Each of its four sides has a midpoint. Now visualize the square whose 
corner-points coincide with these four midpoints. If you visualize the original square with a horizontal 
base, the new square should seem to be tilted, standing on one of its corners, ‘‘like a diamond’’ some 
people say. […] Clearly, the original square is bigger than the tilted square contained within it. How 
much bigger? By means of visual imagination plus some simple reasoning one can find the answer very 
quickly. 
By visualizing this figure, it should be clear that the original square is composed precisely of 
the tilted square plus four corner triangles, each side of the tilted square being the base of a corner 
triangle. One can now visualize the corner triangles folding over, with creases along the sides of the 
tilted square.” 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Giaquinto’s square (ibid, p. 51). 
  
As Giaquinto states “Many people conclude that the corner triangles can be arranged 
to cover the tilted inner square exactly, without any gap or overlap” (ibid.). Such people might 
 be led to deduce, so Giaquinto reasons, that the sum of the area of the four triangles is exactly 
half of the area of the square piece of paper we started with. In fact, a symbolic-propositional 
statement of this can be proven. Giaquinto asks us how, from our folded piece of paper, we 
can be certain that the four triangles completely cover the remaining square.  
Giaquinto raises (amongst others) a worry about equality of size here. Equality of sizes 
are exact attributes of a diagram and thus is not a piece of information that can be read off the 
diagram in Euclidean practice. However, proofs by folding consist of more than some text and 
the crease-diagram, as they also involve the haptic motion of folding. We will argue that this 
haptic moving of the two-dimensional plane through three-dimensional space changes what 
counts as exact and co-exact attributes in the folding idiom with respect to the Euclidean-
diagrammatic idiom. 
Notice here also that, despite superficial similarities, Giaquinto’s fold is different from 
the first step of Row’s proof of the geometric series discussed in section 3.1. Row fully 
triangulated the square by first folding one corner onto the opposite corner, then folding the 
other two corners onto each other, then halving the piece of paper vertically, then halving it 
horizontally and so on. This establishes the mid-points of sides of the relevant squares. 
Furthermore, Row opens the paper up again after a fold. Row reasons on the crease-diagram 
(infused with what can be learned from the folding motion, see below). Giaquinto does not 
reason like this. He takes the mid-points of the edges of the (bigger) square as given and then 
folds four triangles simultaneously. He aims to reason on the already folded piece of paper, 
not on the crease-diagram.  
Row states that folding one corner onto the opposite corner results in two congruent 
triangles; (Row 1893, p. 5). At least on the face of it, Row seems to be reading off an equality 
of size from his folding here. Although Row seems to lack Giaquinto’s awareness of the 
philosophical issues at play here, the reasoning Row follows suggests that we should inquire 
more deeply what can be inferred from the various folding operations. We do so in the next 
subsections. 
 
5.1 What can be read off the folding operations? 
 
Let us go through the basic folding operations and ask what kind of information can be 
rationally obtained by performing the operation. We then come back to the question whether 
Row was justified in stating that the resulting two triangles are congruent. 
Before we go through the basic folding operations, it is important to realize that the 
mathematicians idealize while reasoning by paper folding (cf. section 4.1). In particular, when 
they fold a point onto a point, a line onto a line, a line through a point or a point onto a line, 
these actions are always taken to be successfully carried out with absolute mathematical 
precision. Giaquintonian worries that certain lines (or points) may not align properly are 
ignored.48 We call this “controlled idealization”. We can only infer perfect alignment of two 
geometric objects if they were the target of our folding operation. If, when folding a point 
onto a point, two lines seem to perfectly align, we cannot infer from folding alone that these 
lines are, in fact, perfectly aligned. Such an idealization would be an instance of uncontrolled 
idealization. Uncontrolled idealization is what creates the difficulties with Row’s fold 
                                                          
48 “Is it not the same when through visualizing one concludes that the four corner triangles of a square would fit 
exactly onto he tilted inner square without overlap?” (Giaquinto 2007, p. 53) 
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discussed below. What follows will make more precise what we mean by controlled and 
uncontrolled idealization. To do this, we first establish a sense of what is meant by “controlled 
idealization” and then highlight instances of uncontrolled idealization. 
Basic folding operation 1 is to fold a crease between the given points P and P’. On the 
resulting crease-diagram there is a crease with P and P’ on the line created by the crease. We 
can now read off from the crease diagram that P and P’ are indeed on this line. This is simply 
an instance of controlled idealization. 
Basic folding operation 2 is to fold a point P onto a point P’. The resulting crease-
diagram has two points and a crease in between these two points on it. From the diagram 
alone, we cannot infer that the crease created is a line that is equidistant from P and P’.49 
However, to align the two points we folded the paper. By carrying out this action we can see 
that the line is indeed equidistant from P and P’ because the paper between the crease and P is 
covered by the paper between the crease and P’. We see here that reasoning by paper folding 
relies not solely on the crease-diagram; the haptic motion of folding paper informs the rigor of 
the reasoning. When folding one thus needs to think of the crease-diagram and the folding 
together when considering the reliability of this form of reasoning. The kind of reliable 
information that is obtained by folding lies thus in both the crease-diagram and the haptic 
motion of folding. And this shows a difference of co-exactness between diagrammatic 
reasoning and reasoning by folding. In diagrammatic reasoning, co-exact attributes provide 
reliable information that can be read off the diagram. In folding, reliable information stems 
not only from the diagram alone but is also informed by haptic motion. Co-exact attributes of 
a fold are thus not (necessarily)50 found solely in the crease-diagram but latch onto the crease-
diagram and haptic motion tuple.  
In basic folding operation 3 one folds a line D onto itself such that the resulting crease 
passes through a given point P. From the resulting crease-diagram alone we cannot infer that 
the newly created line is perpendicular to D, because, as Manders has correctly pointed out, in 
a purely diagrammatic idiom the size of an angle is an exact attribute of the diagram. Again, 
the haptic motion of folding adds information here. When folding a line onto itself, controlled 
idealization allows us to infer that the line perfectly aligns with itself. Furthermore, a crease is 
always at a right angle to the line (or lines) along which it was folded since the haptic motion 
shows that one places an angle on an equally sized angle, such that their sum is 180o. Thus, 
the angle between D and the resulting crease are right. 
Notice here that there is an epistemic interplay between the folding operations. 
Operation 1 allows us to create a line between the points P and P’. Operation 2 halves this 
line. From operation 3 we can infer that the point which lies at the intersection between the 
two creases created earlier is the midpoint between P and P’. 
In basic folding operation 4 one folds a point P onto a line D whilst not moving a 
given line D’. As mentioned in section 4.2, this fold can in general only be performed when 
the two lines and the point are given in generic position. This operation marks a point P’ on 
line D which stands in a specific relation to P. This piece of information can then be used in 
further argument. 
                                                          
49 Because distances are exact attributes of a diagram; cf. (Manders 2008). 
50 The co-exact attributes of basic folding operation 1 rely solely on the diagram. 
 Given two lines, D and D’, basic folding operation 5 tells us that we can fold D onto 
D’. When given in generic position, D and D’ intersect. In such a case, the newly created 
crease C divides two opposite angles formed by D and D’. The size of the angle between C 
and D (or D’) is a piece of exact information in a purely diagrammatic reasoning idiom. In the 
folding idiom, from the haptic motion performed when folding it can be read off that the 
angles between C and D and between C and D’ are the same. Thus, C is the angle bisector of 
(two of the angles between) D and D’.  
Basic folding operation 6 starts with two points, P and P’, and a line D. One folds 
through P’ such that P ends up on D. In section 4.2 we pointed out that this fold can only be 
performed in general when P, P’ and D are given in generic position, i.e. when P is “close 
enough” to the line D (see section 4.2). As in operation 4, this marks a new point on the line 
D. 
Basic folding operation 7 is the Beloch fold, i.e. one folds P on line D and point P’ on 
line D’ simultaneously. By folding P onto D, we mark a point p on D where P is aligned 
during the folding action with D. Similarly, a point p’ is marked on D’. Now imagine (or fold) 
a line L between P and p and a line L’ between P’ and p’. From basic folding operation 2 and 
3 we know that the Beloch-crease is perpendicular to both L and L’ and halves these two 
lines. This is precisely the information needed from the fold to double the cube as in section 2. 
Notice that to argue that the constructed line-segment is of the desired length, one needs to 
apply propositional-syntactic reasoning idioms (as presented in section 2). The point here is 
that the Beloch fold provides the kind of information that is necessary for a propositional-
syntactic reasoning to successfully argue that the length of the line-segment is the cube root of 
2. 
 
We now return to the question of the congruence of triangles. Recall that Row folded a 
square paper along its diagonal and claimed that the two resulting triangles are congruent. 
Call this “Row’s fold”. Has he obtained this information solely from the fold and the resulting 
crease-diagram? 
There are at least three ways in which Row’s fold can be thought. To get at these, let 
us consider a square whose corners are ABCD. One way to think of this fold is to fold the 
crease passing through points B and D as in operation 1. To assume that this fold aligns points 
A and C would be an instance of uncontrolled idealization as such inferences are not 
supported by the folding operations as discussed above. Such an inference is thus not 
permissible. This way of thinking about Row’s fold is not particularly helpful.  
Perhaps it is more natural to think of Row’s fold as aligning points A and C. Alas, this 
is also not helpful as such a fold does not allow us to infer that the lines AB and BC align on 
pain of uncontrolled idealization.  
The most suitable way of thinking about Row’s fold is to think of it as aligning two 
lines as in operation 5. This is in fact how Row reasoned, when constructing his square (see 
section 3.1). Say we fold line AB onto line BC. Since we know that the line AB and BC are 
equal in length (they are sides of a square), we know that A and C perfectly align by 
performing this fold. Furthermore, by aligning AB and BC, we know that the resulting crease 
halves the angle ABC. Since the angle is right, the resulting angles are 45 degrees. Note that 
Row constructs his square (as indicated in section 3.1) in such a way such that the crease ends 
at a point, which is only then denoted as the point D. That is, the vertex D is constructed as 
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the end-point of the crease-segment, hence the crease segment is constructed as the diagonal 
of the square. This enables Row to read off from the folding diagram the properties of a 
diagonal, in contrast to Giaquinto’s treatment. Furthermore, we know that the angles DAB 
and BCD remain right because they are not interfered with by the folding operation. Thus, we 
know that the two triangles have two angles which are equal (DAB and BCD) and the line 
between these two angles (AB and BC) are equal in length. We can thus argue by the side-
angle-side postulate that the two triangles are congruent. Indeed, this seems necessary because 
inferring from the fold alone that the lines BC and DA align perfectly would be an instance of 
uncontrolled idealization. 
Whilst this resolves the question why the two triangles are congruent, it does so by 
relying on a postulate about the congruence of triangles. This postulate was not shown by 
Row as what can be read off the haptic folding operations, and we confess our inability to see 
how it could ever be proved by a reasoning idiom that relies purely on folding (and text). Row 
may thus have been a bit too hopeful when he claimed that when doing geometry by paper 
folding “it would not be necessary to take any statement on trust” (Row 1893, p. ii). Our 
philosophical analysis of the rigor of reasoning by paper folding suggests that it is indeed 
necessary to accept certain statements on trust.51 This adds to the point we made earlier about 
different reasoning idioms being used in the folding practice.  
We have seen earlier that the mathematicians practising folding switch with ease 
between symbolic-propositional reasoning idioms and a folding idiom. In this section, we 
pointed out that the folding idiom relies not only on text and the folding diagram but also on 
the haptic motion of the fold. Because this haptic motion allows for controlled idealizations, it 
provides information beyond empirical evidence. Folding as practised is thus more rigorous 
than Giaquinto’s points suggest52, which we showed by highlighting what pieces of 
information can be rationally obtained from the basic folding operations. This rigor needs to 
be augmented by some “statements taken on trust” for certain arguments to function properly. 
 
6 Folding as a material reasoning practice  
 
As we saw in section 2, Row wrote 
 
“This would give [the children] neat and accurate figures, and impress the truth of the 
propositions forcibly on their minds. It would not be necessary to take any statement 
on trust.” 
 
This quotation shows that for Row, one does not have to justify folding in terms of other 
idioms (propositional, symbolical, etc.). Beloch however acknowledged folding as not 
necessarily evidential. We would like to emphasize that for different mathematicians, folding 
practice had different roles. But both Row and Beloch pointed to the epistemic force of 
reasoning by paper folding. Our claim, as was already indicated in earlier sections, is that this 
force is obtained from the physical realities of the material used. It is in this sense that we call 
reasoning by paper folding a material reasoning practice. 
                                                          
51 This is a similarity to Euclidean geometric reasoning. 
52 However, recall that Giaquinto may not have been interested in the rigor of this reasoning practice. 
  In Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning the constructive moves in a diagram are 
inferential actions.53 As Larvor (2017) writes, “[the constructive moves] are strictly controlled 
by the first three postulates – nothing else is permitted”.54 But there were debates about 
whether other constructive moves should be permitted. There is a host of marked and moving 
ruler constructions, which have been discussed since the time of the ancient Greeks.55 The use 
of such tools and instruments was not well accepted as truly geometrical by the mathematical 
community at large;56 indeed, according to Plutarch, 
 
“Plato himself reproached Eudoxus and Archytas and Menaechmus for setting out to remove the 
problem of doubling the cube into the realm of instruments and mechanical devices, as if they were 
trying to find two mean proportionals not by the use of reason but in whatever way would work. In this 
way, he thought, the advantage of geometry was dissipated and destroyed, since it slipped back into the 
realm of sense-perception instead of soaring upward and laying hold of the eternal and immaterial 
images […]” (Plutarch 1961, pp. 121-123) 
 
  
 Folding is also an inferential action. This is because we start with some condition (e.g. 
“given a square”), realise it on the sheet of paper (fold a square as Row did), then construct 
lines by folding (e.g. a diagonal of the square) and at the end we have some more information 
which we can read off our sheet of paper. Unlike Euclidean diagrammatic constructions 
however, the constructive moves of folding are not justified by the tools we use. Reasoning by 
paper folding does not rely on tools such as rulers or compasses. Rather, a constructive move 
is justified just in case it can be carried out on the sheet of paper. The (idealized) physical 
realities of paper thus control the constructive moves. Because such moves are inferential 
actions, the physical realities of paper control the inferential actions of reasoning by paper 
folding.  
 
 Not all diagrammatic reasoning relies on tools or delineating all permitted constructive 
moves for diagram construction at the outset. As an example, consider diagram construction 
in diagrammatic reasoning in knot theory:57 
 
“In order to draw a diagram for a knot, we project it on a plane, by keeping track, 
for each crossing in the projection, of which arc goes over and which under. Not 
all projection directions are allowed, since the projection must be regular, i.e. (i) 
                                                          
53 See (Manders 2008) and (Larvor 2017). 
54 In footnote 13, Larvor adds: “With the exception of Elements I.4, where a triangle is rigidly displaced. This is 
well-known to commentators” (p. 7). 
55 Many of these can be found in (Bos 2001). 
56 Discussions about what counts as mathematical continue to this day. Consider for example the debate about 
computer-assisted proofs; e.g. (Mackenzie 1999). 
57 Unlike common knots, which are tied in pieces of string with loose ends, mathematical knots are 
configurations of string whose ends are joined. Note in addition that the “string” in a mathematical knot is 
one without thickness. 
 We commented above on the embodied practices and competency of folding. One may similarly remark on 
the competency of knotting (e.g. give a novice to tie a Winsor knot for a necktie). This gap between 
diagrammatic instruction and competent enactment of these instructions poses a problem, engagement with 
which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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the intersection points are in finite number, (ii) they are transversal and (iii) no 
more than two arcs meet at a time.” (De Toffoli and Giardino 2013, p. 832) 
In this case diagrams are projections of three-dimensional objects, which have possibly been 
subject to “manipulative imagination” (p. 829).  These objects – knotted pieces of string – are 
subject to the physical realities of string. There is a similarity to reasoning by paper folding.  
By folding paper, we obtain a piece of paper with lines scattered across it: the crease-
diagram. We nonetheless argue that folding is not a diagrammatic reasoning practice. Unlike 
Euclidean diagrammatic reasoning, in which (some)58 permissible constructive moves are 
explicitly given at the outset in propositional form, the permissible constructive moves of the 
practice of folding are discovered rather than given. Mathematicians came to know the basic 
folding operations. In fact, there is a reasoning tradition which explores what the permissible 
constructive moves of folding are; cf. section 5. In the folding practice there is also no debate 
about whether other tools for construction should be permitted. The crease-diagram is neither 
a representation of what is reasoned about as are the diagrams of knot theory, nor does folding 
require “manipulative imagination”. Indeed, as noted above, we can imagine how folding 
creates a fold, but we cannot manipulate it as we want, creasing, for example, just near the 
desired place. Also, as mentioned above, the idealization that takes place with folding is  
controlled, which is also true for knot-diagrams. However, in contrast to knot-diagrams, 
reasoning by folding is more direct than diagrammatic reasoning, as it does not come to 
represent a line (or a knot), it creates one. This points to another aspect we mentioned above, 
that the haptic motion must be taken into account when considering this reasoning.  
 Larvor (2017) argues that there is an essential use of non-textual inferential actions in 
diagrammatic reasoning. To translate diagrammatic reasoning into other idioms is to change 
the object on which the inferential action is carried out: traduttore traditore. In the case of 
folding, such translations betray the original reasoning less. This is because, unlike in 
Euclidean practice, in the practice of folding as depicted in this article, many practitioners 
have modern formalised notation at their disposal. Some of the works on folding discussed in 
this article move with ease from the haptic-motion part of the folding idiom to a modern 
propositional one and back again.59 Some scholars seem to prefer haptic motions; Row 
included very few mathematical arguments given in a propositional idiom. Others, such as 
Beloch, argued entirely within the propositional idiom; there are no pictures of any kind in 
Beloch's work on folding and to prove the generality of her fold, she needed to turn to an 
argument from analytic geometry. The situation which the practitioners of folding share 
(Rouse) is one in which different idioms not only exist simultaneously – this is true of 
Euclidean practice as well – but in which the idioms are readily interchangeable and are 
regularly interchanged. Diagrammatic reasoning stops being diagrammatic reasoning when all 
the diagrams are translated into propositional idioms. This is not true of folding. A proof by 
paper folding does not actually have to be folded (even though it could be). Traduttore 
partecipante may be the better slogan here.  
                                                          
58 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that the performance of an Euclidean proof also 
requires practical action for which no rules are given at the outset in propositional form; e.g. (Livingston 
1999).  
59 For an insightful account of conceptual agility in modern mathematics, see Manders’ unpublished article 
“Euclid or Descartes? Representation and Responsiveness”. 
  To conclude: to construct a line, an angle bisector, or marking new points is part of the 
information that can be read off the various folding actions. The inferential actions of folding 
(the folding operations) are justified by the physical realities of paper. The epistemic force of 
these inferential actions is harvested both through propositional and through folding-
diagrammatic idioms, where it either functions as what provides evidence for the proposed 
claim, or only functions as “an a priori means of acquiring belief” (Giaquinto 2007, p. 67). 
The practice of mathematical paper folding is thus neither purely propositional nor 
diagrammatic in the sense used by Manders, Larvor, De Toffoli and Giardino. We propose to 
name this reasoning by the source of its epistemic force: the material. 
 
7. Enabling a mathematical culture of folding 
 
We have argued that folding is a material reasoning practice. We now turn our attention to the 
theme of this special issue: enabling mathematical cultures. We suggest that the mathematical 
practice of paper folding as performed and sustained by the above described community of 
mathematicians during the 20th century has enabled a mathematical culture of folding. 
What do we mean by “enabling”? The term may be understood as indicating a space – 
either virtual or physical – where mathematicians can meet and communicate. If paper 
enables a (mathematical) folding culture – we engage with this question below – then the way 
paper enables such a culture is not by providing a space for discussion. Rather, paper 
sanctions and disqualifies certain constructive moves.60 That is, as we showed, paper enables 
a certain kind of reasoning.61  
 
7.1 Paper folding as a mathematical culture? 
 
When thinking of (folded) paper as a medium that enables modes of reasoning, we 
may think that in doing so it establishes certain customs, beliefs and knowledge. This 
connects nicely to Tylor’s definition of culture of 1871: 
 
Culture […] is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
law, morals, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society (Tylor 1871, p. 1) 
  
 Tylor’s definition is what Kroeber and Kluckhohn call “descriptive” (1952, p. 
43). It enumerates what belongs to a culture. As Kroeber and Kluckhohn point out, such 
enumerations can never be exhaustive and what is not mentioned tends to be left out in 
further thinking. Besides such general criticisms, there is a more direct worry in 
connection to folding as a culture, which has to do with the idea of shared beliefs and 
customs. To get at this, let us consider cultures as conglomerations of shared beliefs. 
  The idea that cultures are conglomerations of shared beliefs has tradition. Banks 
and McGee Banks write: 
 
                                                          
60 It may be necessary to argue that such moves can be generally performed; see section 4. 
61 Paper as a material on which formulas and mathematical texts are written may also enable mathematical 
cultures, but this is not the topic of this article. 
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Culture also consists of the shared beliefs, symbols and interpretations within a 
human group. […] The essence of a culture is not its artefacts, tools, or other 
tangible cultural elements but how the members of the group interpret, use, and 
perceive them. (Banks and McGee Banks 1989, p. 8) 
 
More recently, the shared beliefs of a culture have been cashed out as mental states: 
 
Culture is information capable of affecting individuals’ behavior that they 
acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and 
other forms of social transmission. By information we mean any kind of mental 
state, conscious or not, that is acquired or modified by social learning and affects 
behavior. We will use everyday words like idea, knowledge, belief, value, skill 
and attitude to describe this information. (Richerson and Boyd 2005, p. 5) 
 
Culture as mental states is an extreme form of the culture-as-shared-beliefs idea 
because it pushes culture into (the skull of) a single agent. In Richerson and Boyd’s 
definition, there is no need for a community to exist; a single agent could have all the 
right kind of mental states to carry an entire culture “in her head”. This, we suggest, is 
an unreasonable understanding of the term “culture”. We thus discard such radical 
forms of the culture-as-shared-beliefs idea and consider how more moderate versions of 
it align with the thought that folding may be a culture. 
Folding can lead to shared beliefs and knowledge because folding can, with the 
caveats discussed earlier, prove mathematical theorems and construct mathematical 
objects. But neither folding nor paper enables these beliefs or knowledge. The 
mathematical theorems proven via folding were already known from other mathematical 
idioms; folding has not led to any new theorems (yet?). What paper enables is not the 
belief in a mathematical proposition but the reasoning that supports this proposition. 
The question is thus whether the mathematicians who fold paper share beliefs about this 
type of reasoning. 
 The answer to our question is negative. As highlighted in section 2, 
mathematicians folded paper for various reasons. They had different backgrounds in 
terms of the time and place they lived in. Row was influenced indirectly by Fröbel’s 
activities and their reconceptualization in India. He was interested in mathematical 
education and attempted to popularize folding as a geometrical practice on equal footing 
with the axiomatic approach. Hurwitz saw paper folding mainly as suitable for 
constructing regular polygons, but did not consider his results important enough to be 
published. Beloch treated folding as a piece of research mathematics but also thought of 
it as having pedagogical value. She published only few articles on paper folding. In 
contrast to Row, Beloch was a professor at a university, and her interests were mainly in 
other fields (algebraic geometry, topology and starting from the 1930s, also 
photogrammetry). Huzita had a very different aim and belief regarding the relations 
between folding and mathematics; he was one of the first mathematicians who aimed at 
a full axiomatization of folding based geometry. There is thus no shared belief on the 
value of this type of reasoning. 
 Furthermore, mathematicians disagree on the epistemic strength of reasoning by 
paper folding. We highlighted that Row attributed rigor to proofs by folding. He was not 
alone in this; cf. (Friedman 2018a, section 5.1.1). Others disagreed; for example, Young 
and Young’s (1905) critical view on Row’s work.  
It is also unclear to what extent Beloch, Justin and Huzita regarded proofs by 
folding as rigorous. Justin and Huzita transposed folding proofs into a symbolic 
propositional idiom. To conclude that they were hence doubtful about the rigor of 
proofs by folding would, however, be misguided. Formalizing the basic folding 
operations in the way they did allowed them to access questions about what folds can 
generally be performed. We have highlighted that this is one tradition (the other being 
proving theorems and constructing shapes) we can find in the folding practice; cf. 
section 5. 
 Focusing again on shared beliefs, Netz highlights: “Shared beliefs are much less 
common than shared practices … Beliefs cannot explain the scientific process” (1999, 
p. 2). Netz understands “practices” here as ways of doing things. This is useful because 
it allows for cohesion within a group, even if there is disagreement about certain beliefs. 
This also connects with Rouse’s point about practices being shared situations rather than 
systems of beliefs.  
 Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952, pp. 50-55) have pointed out that normative 
definitions of culture with an emphasis on rules or ways of doing things – and we may 
read Netz’ quotation as such – stress the idea of artificiality and arbitrariness of 
cultures.62 This argument is a point of discontinuity with a Rousian understanding of 
paper folding as a shared situation. Reasoning by paper folding, we argued, draws much 
of its strengths from the physical realities of the material folded. These physical realities 
provide a mechanism of control for the norms of reasoning by paper folding.  
Kroeber and Kluckhohn provide a definition of culture of their own: 
 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behaviour acquired 
and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human 
groups, including their embodiments in artefacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially 
their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as 
products of action, and on the other as conditioning elements of further action 
(Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, p. 181)  
 
 Kroeber and Kluckhohn come to the culture term from a social scientific and 
specifically from an anthropological point of view. They think of the values that are attached 
to the traditional ideas that make up the essential core of culture as the “dos and don’ts” that 
shape social groups. One would be hard pressed to define a mathematical folding culture 
along these lines because the approaches to folding that were taken are too heterogeneous: 
some preferred fully syntactic-propositional idioms (e.g. Beloch), others were attracted by the 
                                                          
62 “The ‘arbitrariness’ of a cultural phenomenon is a function of its particular historical determination. 
‘Artificiality’ is related to a different set of problems hinging on the role of culture in human life. Is it a 
thwarting or fulfilling or both? Is man’s ‘culturalness’ just a thin film, an epiphenomenon, capping his 
naturalness? Or are cultural features in man’s life so important that culture becomes the capstone to human 
personality?” (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952, 52) 
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haptic motions of folding (e.g. Row). This is not to say that the mathematicians who reasoned 
by paper folding did not share any values. Most, if not all, were working in the context of the 
rise of mathematical modernism, a movement that aimed to formalize entire mathematical 
domains; see (Mehrtens 1990). “The modernist ideology in mathematics preached 
renunciation from the world, in the sense that one did not do geometry or analysis […] by 
taking as given what is presented by idealized common-sense” (Gray 2006, p. 390). 
Mathematical modernism influenced the folding practice and its values were shared by many 
(if not most) mathematicians who practised folding. Yet these values are too broadly shared 
amongst mathematicians to define a folding culture. 
 Mathematical cultures will be influenced by social norms such as Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn’s dos and don’ts; we will discuss these norms briefly in the following subsection. 
However, we submit that the mathematicians discussed in this article share an appreciation for 
the kind of reasoning that emerges when proving by paper folding. That is, they value the 
Rousian situation they all find themselves in. 
 None of what we have said amounts to a definition of mathematical culture and we do 
not attempt to give such a definition here. Instead, we suggest to reflect on what has been said 
with an eye towards learning what mathematical cultures can be like. If we take for granted 
that mathematical paper folding is a mathematical culture – and we believe this to be a 
sensible assumption – then what keeps a mathematical culture together need not be a large-
scale agreement about certain beliefs, but rather a shared situation, which can come into 
realization via shared practices. Cultures can form when the Rousian situation appeals, even if 
the reasons why the situation appeals are different for different agents. If this is correct, then 
Rousian situations can enable mathematical cultures if they provide elements that can be 
appreciated by mathematicians. Folding paper, we submit, is such a Rousian situation. Paper 
thus enables a mathematical culture because it provides a Rousian situation. 
 
7.2 Enabling a mathematical culture of paper folding 
 
We indicated at the end of the last subsection that paper enables the mathematical culture of 
paper folding. However, paper is not the only precondition for the emergence of paper folding 
as a mathematical culture. In Japan origami has a long tradition with specialized paper and 
standard exercises, yet it is well known that no mathematical culture of paper folding 
developed. Though several folding exercises in Japan were mathematical in nature, 
resembling the tradition of European recreational mathematics (Maekawa 2015), most of 
these exercises – at least until the 1860s-1870s63 – were purely decorative and served 
ceremonial purposes (Hatori 2011). One cannot find any equivalent development in Japan to 
the western tradition of mathematical paper folding.  
 This suggests that paper is a necessary condition for the emergence of shared practices 
and shared situations of mathematical paper folding, but is not a sufficient one. We submit 
that such a question – what enables a mathematical culture? – is eventually also a 
sociological-political one, as adopting a mathematical culture implies accepting certain social 
norms. To defend such a claim is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we offer a brief but 
                                                          
63 Cf. (Hatori 2011, p. 10): “In the first years of the Meiji Restoration, in the 1860s and 1870s, the European 
education system was introduced and adopted in Japan. As a result, European origami was imported to Japan 
as a part of the kindergarten curriculum.” 
 suggestive discussion of the social conditions that enabled the rise of mathematical paper 
folding at the end of the 19th century. 
 As mentioned in section 2, Row was influenced by Fröbel’s ideas about paper folding. 
Fröbel considered his exercises to be able to transmit abstract mathematical knowledge. 
Through (guided) exploration of these exercises children would come to appreciate patterns, 
structure, and principles ultimately conducive to their logical-quantitative development.64 
However, when his ideas were implemented in the kindergartens in the United Kingdom, this 
mathematical aspect was slowly abandoned or considered as irrelevant (Friedman 2018b). But 
when the United Kingdom took charge of the education in kindergartens in India in 1854, and 
especially starting 1875, when Fröbelian pedagogy was promoted in Madras, the situation was 
different.65 The geographical distance from the United Kingdom allowed for a different 
perception of Fröbelian mathematical ideas. A book such as Row’s could be written, which 
gave an opportunity for folding to emerge as a mathematical culture. Explicitly, Fröbel’s 
alternative ideas and alternative media for the transmission of mathematical knowledge gave 
rise to alternative ways of knowing, and eventually to an alternative epistemic force. This 
alternative epistemic force could be recognized as such because of a surrounding culture or 
intellectual landscape which did not consider paper and its associated activities (i.e. paper 
folding) as a mere children play. Where the soil of the intellectual landscape of the United 
Kingdom was barren for Fröbel’s ideas, the intellectual landscape in India proved fertile.  
The soil in India was fertile but not without resistance. Consider here the final 
sentence in the introduction of Row’s book: “‘Old boys’ like myself may find the book useful 
to revive their old lessons, and to have a peep into modern developments which, although 
very interesting and instructive, have been ignored by the Madras University” (Row 1893, p. 
vi). The existence of “alternative” players such as Row was not sufficient to enable a 
mathematical culture. What was needed was a form of recognition from the existing 
mathematical community. And Row’s ideas enjoyed this form of recognition. Other 
mathematicians in India at the end of the 19th century attempted to explain geometry with the 
help of folding, even if they did not receive any recognition from  institutions, academic or 
otherwise (for the case of the 1888 Hanumantha Rao’s book First Lessons in Geometry, see: 
Friedman 2018a, p. 250–254). As pointed out in section 2, Felix Klein mentioned Row’s book 
in his 1895 book Vorträge über ausgewählte Fragen der Elementargeometrie. The translation 
of Klein’s book to English in 1897, as well as the republication of Row’s book by Beman and 
Smith in the USA in 1901 positioned Row’s book – due to Klein’s remark, who was certainly 
one of the most important mathematicians in Germany in this period – as a book that is 
approved by the mathematical community as valuable.  
                                                          
64 This can be seen in Fröbel’s 1850 manuscript: “Anleitung zum Papierfalten” (instruction for paper-folding; 
Fröbel 1874, p. 371–388; see also: Friedman 2018a, p. 223–227). Fröbel begins the manuscript with the 
creation of a square from any piece of paper with the help of folding and cutting. He then guides the child to 
fold the square along various lines and creases. For example, in step number ten (of Fröbel’s instructions), he 
notes that two different forms may have the same area: folding the square along one of its diagonals results in 
a triangle whose area is half of the area of the square; and folding one edge on its parallel edge results in a 
rectangle, whose area is also half of the area of the square. This leads him to declare that “half is the same as 
a half” (Fröbel 1874, p. 379), introducing, without naming it explicitly, the notion of a fraction, while 
pointing to its abstraction from a material realization.  
 
65 For a discussion and further references about the transfer of the Fröbelian methods from Great Britain to India 
at the second half of the 19th century, see: (Friedman 2018a, p. 247–250). 
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 Paper folding as a mathematical culture was, in this case, enabled by an implicit 
approval from the principal “players” of the mathematical community. In that sense, even 
though folding paper does lay the ground for alternative participants (Fröbel, Row) in the 
mathematical community, in order to enable this practice to be considered as a mathematical 
culture, with a community and shared mathematical practices of its own, we suggest that it is 
not only paper that enabled this culture. It required also an implicit confirmation from the 
principal “players” (Klein, Smith) of these activities as mathematical  to enable the formation 
of paper folding as a mathematical culture. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we presented folding as a material reasoning practice. As was surveyed, there 
was and is a sufficiently large community of mathematicians who share in the same situation. 
Thus, folding should be regarded as one of the mathematical reasoning practices. This 
reasoning practice is neither purely propositional, since it relies on certain qualities of the 
physical artifacts used, nor is it diagrammatic, since non-textual inference steps are not 
necessary in this reasoning practice. It is material because the material used justifies the 
constructive inference steps used in this reasoning practice. Thus, folding is a further facet of 
the plurality the forms of reasoning used in mathematics. 
 For these reasons we suggest that the mathematical material practice of folding 
enables a unique mathematical culture. This culture is distinct from diagrammatic 
mathematical cultures66 because, as we showed, the modes of reasoning of folding are 
different from the modes of reasoning in diagrammatic reasoning cultures.  Furthermore, we 
showed that folding is not part of a “mathematical modernism”, which in a lot of ways 
neglected and rejected reasoning practices of mathematics which are not purely propositional, 
such as drawing two-dimensional diagrams, constructing three-dimensional models or folding 
paper. Understood as a movement, however, mathematical modernism influences the folding 
culture: reasoning by folding was and is operating along the syntactical idiom propagated by 
mathematical modernism. The mathematicians who folded (and fold) often rely on this idiom 
to prove the generality of material operations.  
 Although many of the mathematicians who practiced paper folding as mathematical 
practice did not share the same beliefs regarding the aims and the epistemic strength of 
folding as a mathematical material practice, they shared the same situation. This situation is 
brought about by the physical realities of the material, which provides a structure of control 
for geometric constructions. Hence, considering folding as a mathematical haptic operation – 
as all the above-discussed mathematicians did – enabled the emergence of this material 
practice as a shared situation and thereby prompted, starting at least from the end of the 19th 
century, the emergence of a distinctive and unique mathematical culture. 
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